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8. Worlds from Words: Theories of World-building as Creative Writing Toolbox 
Jeremy Scott 
 
8.1 Writingandreading: creative practice and research 
Creative writing has been looking at itself quite hard recently. This introspection has been 
prompted by its increasing popularity as an academic discipline within a higher education 
context and its need to justify a position in that research-led context as an object of rigorous 
scholarly activity (see Kroll and Harper5 2013, Sigesmund and Cahnmann-Taylor 2008, 
Smith and Dean 2009 and Leavy 2009). In short, creative writing is arguably in need of a 
sound and principled theoretical infrastructure. Previous practioners in this area have 
suggested poetics, broadly, and narratology, more specifically, as possible candidates for this 
infrastructure (see, for example, Rodriguez 2008).  
 The field of poetics has concerned itself with the categorization of types of literary 
discourse; indeed, AristotleÕs collected writings on the subject were for centuries viewed as a 
rulebook for dramatic and poetic composition. Subsequently, much later literary and 
linguistic theory, particularly genre theory, narrative theory and the work of Mikhail Bakhtin 
and Gyrgy Luks (Leitch 2001: 88), performed a similar role, exploring the mechanics of 
narrative fiction from the perspective of its use of language. However, as I have suggested 
previously (Scott 2014), a more worthy contender for the role of theoretical underpinning for 
creative writing might be stylistics. To develop this argument in more detail, I wish to 
suggest here that cognitive poetics and that disciplineÕs focus on processes of linguistic 
world-building and the mechanics of ÔactualizingÕ readings provide the creative writing with 
invaluable insights into what happens when readers read. 
 It is hoped, then, that this chapter will be pioneering, and a survey of potentialities and 
directions for future exploration rather than in any sense definitive. It considers the 
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implications of linguistic approaches to textual analysis from, as it were, the other end of the 
telescope: explicitly for the creative writer and his or her creative practice. The central (and 
simple) proposal for the chapter is this: there is a remarkable facility in the mind of the reader 
which enables her or him to be transported imaginatively to fictional worlds which may or 
may not bear relation to his or her actual world: to modern Bangkok, ancient Greece, 
Victorian London, the mountains of TolkienÕs Middle Earth, the surface of Mars. This 
process might sometimes be referred to in everyday terms as Ôsuspension of disbeliefÕ, but the 
cognitive poetics term world-building is more accurate and useful. This remarkable facility of 
human language is something that creative writers should understand and aim to exploit Ð 
and, crucially, should also be wary of disrupting unnecessarily (or, at least, be mindful of 
what happens when it is disrupted). It is in advancing writerly understanding of readerly 
sensibilities that cognitive poetics, and linguistic theories of world-building specifically, have 
much to offer practitioners. The writer can gain sophisticated and nuanced appreciation of the 
ways in which language can be used to create and manipulate worlds that exist at different 
cognitive, discoursal and rhetorical ÔlevelsÕ and in different relationships to one another. 
 There are countless themes within cognitive poetics that are ripe for exploration from 
the perspective of creative practice. By necessity, this chapter is selective in its scope and will 
consider the following themes as a starting point for future debate: abstract versus concrete 
conceptions of world and language; relationships between language and thought and 
imagination and creativity (schema theory); deixis and empathyÕ perceived compatabilities 
between worlds and discourses; and avoiding inhibition of return. Overarching all of these 
themes will be theoretical architecture drawing on first, Text World Theory and, second, 
Possible Worlds Theory (although not associated directly with cognitive poetics, Possible 
Worlds Theory has interest and relevant points to make about the relationship between fiction 
and truth which shed light on other issues explored in this chapter). A final qualifying point: 
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the term story world will be used throughout to refer in a general sense to the overarching 
fictional world invoked by the text in the imagination of the reader, rather than in a strictly 
theoretical sense (e.g. Herman 2004 and Phelan 2004). 
 This chapter should not be seen as suggestions towards pedagogy, although of course 
these ideas could and should have such impact. Rather, its principal purpose is to connect 
more directly to creative practice out there Ôat the coal faceÕ, and to the workings and to the 
workings and interactions between the creative and the critical. Stylistics and its sub-
disciplines can aid creative writers involved in practice-led research in articulating rigorously 
the relationship between creative output and its inputs, thus developing a principled 
perspective on practice. Lasky (2014: 22) represents these relationships diagrammatically: 
 
INSERT SCOTT FIGURE HERE  
 
The central component of the diagram is the hinge between the panels (the dotted line) that 
allows movement between them; through exploration of the connections between these 
processes, it should be possible for creative writers to produce a principled reflection rooted 
in cognitive poetics that can underpin practice-based research. There are problems inherent 
here, of course. To name two: overt focus on practice and lead to an excessive and inhibiting 
self-consciousness; and a disassociation of creative and critical attitudes and aspects can in 
some instances be undesirable. However, it is hoped that at the very least, the following will 
lay the ground for subsequent more detailed discussion and debate. 
In partial resolution of the second problem, I would like to invoke a neologism coined by the 
cognitive linguistic Keith Oatley (2003) which allows us not only to view the role of creative 
practitioner and critical analysis as part and parcel of the same entity, but also to better 
understand the cognitive processes that are engaged during creative practice. Oatley uses the 
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term ÔwritingandreadingÕ to describe the way in which two activities, traditionally considered 
separate, are often intimately bound together. 
 
ÔWritingandreadingÕ is not an English world. It should be. We tend to think 
of the two parts as separate. Pure writing is possible. One may just write an 
email, careless of syntax and spelling, then press a key, and off it goes into 
the ether. Pure reading is also possible: one can absorb, if that is an apt 
metaphor, the information in a newspaper article with almost no thought 
except what the writer has supplied. More usually we writeandread. É A 
text is not autonomous. That is to say it does not stand alone: responsibility 
is distributed between writer and reader (2003: 161). 
 
Oatley refers here to an essential dichotomy which lies at the heart of creative writing and the 
worlds that it builds: between that which is autonomous and that which is heteronomous 
(Howarth 2012). If the former term can be used to categorize something that can be 
demonstrated to exist independently of perception, then the latter refers to that which is 
brought into existence and validated only by the presence of an observing and sentient 
consciousness. Dufrenne (1973), from the perspective of literary criticism, views the matter 
as follows: 
 
Éwhoever grants the heteronomous existence of sentences (and thus of the 
literary work), must also accept all of its autonomous foundations and must 
not be content with pure acts of consciousness (which are sufficient to 
define the heteronomy of the intentional object). These supplementary 
foundations are, on the one hand, the subjective operations which preside 
over the creation of the work. On the other hand, and above all, they are 
Ôideal conceptsÕ to which the sentences of the work refer and which are 
actualised in them (209-10). 
 
However, a treatment based on cognitive poetics combined with OatleyÕs writingandreading 
can do better. It can highlight the essential interconnectedness of the ÔsentencesÕ and Ôideal 
conceptsÕ which they create, in essence by treating the heteronomous worlds formed in the 
act of reading and the autonomous texts which give birth to them as equivalent and 
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interchangeable. Creative writing as artefact, as typed or printed words on a page or screen, is 
autonomous. It has a physical, sensory presence as we turn its pages or, indeed, scroll through 
it with a mouse or a fingertip. The worlds that it creates in our imaginations are Ð at least 
intuitively Ð heteronomous. In philosophical terms, then, this concept is closely related to 
phenomenalism: the idea that physical objects, events, properties and artefacts are reducible 
to mental objects, events, properties and artefacts. To put this as simply as possible, and at the 
risk of glibness: our thoughts do not just shape out world, they are our world. As cognitive 
poetics can demonstrate, this proposal is analogous to processes of world-building from 
linguistic prompts as well as the ways in which such worlds take on a powerful, resonant and 
affective existence in the imagination. It also raises various philosophical and ontological 
questions. In what sense is the felt experience of a story world different from the felt 
experience derived from the actual world? How is it that story worlds can take on an 
existence of their own? We have all had the experience of being truly gripped, moved, 
gladdened or saddened by a poem or story; if the worlds that these texts create are ÔunrealÕ, 
then how do they both stimulate and simulate real emotional responses? (See Stockwell 2002: 
171-3 and Oatley 1992: 18-20 for further discussion, of this as well as some theoretical 
propositions in response to the question).  
 Creative practice at its most invigorating should involve becoming both writer and 
reader at the same time, through the processes of writingandreading. The act of creative 
writing is characterized by the two activities being more integrated, or part and parcel of the 
same process: to write as we read, and to read as we write. This assertion is given further 
strength if we take into account the idea of reading as performance as formulated through 
reception theory. Any text constructed from language is not simply ÔreceivedÕ in a passive 
sense by its reader (Jauss 1982), but is interpreted according to individual cultural contexts 
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and lived experience. Cognitive poetics also asserts this via its appropriation of Schema 
Theory: see Bartlett 1932; Jeffries 2001; Shank and Abelson 1977, and Semino 2001).  
 A schema (Bartlett 1932, Shank and Abelson 1977) is a cognitive framework that 
helps the participant in the discourse world (in the case of creative writing, the reader) to sort, 
organize and interpret incoming linguistic information by activating pre-existing Ômental 
baggageÕ, often dependent on cultural context and background. For example, British and Irish 
readers will have a particular ÔpubÕ schema which will be activated when processing that 
noun, calling to mind mental representations of a bar area, beer taps, glasses, customers, the 
smell of food, the hum of conversation and so on. Schemas allow shortcuts to be taken when 
interpreting the, often complex, linguistic information provided by a text. It is this facility in 
the mind of the reader that writers exploit when,proving linguistic cues from which readers 
subsequently build worlds; from minimal linguistic input, a rich and complex text-world can 
be constructed cognitively through a combination of the Ôtop downÕ information stored in the 
relevant schema (say, the pub schema mentioned above) with Ôbottom upÕ linguistic 
information from the text itself (which might impart more specific information, building on 
the initial schema: the pub has a thatched roof and is next to a pond, for example). The 
readerÕs perception of the world built by a text is dependent upon the ways in which that 
readerÕs package of schemas is reinforced or challenged during the act of reading (Semino 
1997: 119). I am proposing a melding of schema-based conceptions of world-building 
(focused on reading practice) with stylistic analysis of the discourse of the text, and placing 
an awareness of this combination at the forefront of creative practice. The remainder of this 
chapter will be devoted to exploring just a few of the many ways in which this could be done. 
 
8.2 Words and worlds 
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One of the principal cognitive models for understanding what happens when a reader 
processes discourse is Text World Theory (Gavins 2007; Werth 1999), which can be aligned 
with the reading end of OatleyÕs neologism. ÔSteamÕ stylistics/narratology (Carter 2010: 61) 
can be aligned to the writing end. To reiterate: creative writers should think of 
writingandreading as a synthesis of complementary and inseparable activities. However, I 
wish to demonstrate in this section that one or the other will be in the ascendency during 
different stages of the creative process, and that Text World Theory can help show how this 
happens and why. 
 To illustrate this notion more concretely, it will be useful to turn to a literary example. 
In Jorge Luis BorgesÕs short story ÔTln, Uqbar, Orbis TertiusÕ (2000: 72), the author posits 
the existence of a world, Tln, where a language is spoken/written that does not contain 
nouns. Without nouns, argues the narrator, all Western thought becomes impossible. He cites 
the following example (the numbering is my own for ease of reference):  
 
(1) The moon rose above the water. 
 
This sentence is rendered in the Tlnic language as follows: 
 
(2) Hlr u fang axaxaxas ml. 
 
To attempt a translation into English that is syntactically rather than semantically authentic, 
the narrator offers the following: 
 




This Ôsyntactic simulationÕ (3) has two prepositions (upward and behind), an article, a 
neologistic verb-as-noun or gerund (onstreaming) and a past tense verb (it mooned). In 
keeping with the cognitive approach, we should posit that the syntactical simulation has a 
cognitive effect. To lend weight to this assertion, it will be useful to invoke the 
Generalization Commitment (Lakoff 1990, Langaker 1991 and 1999) which asserts that 
different levels of language share common features. Accordingly, there is no clear separation 
between syntax and semantics; in the cognitive view, syntactc structures are themselves 
inherently meaningful. Thus, the structures and systems of language have an impact on the 
way we create a text-world in response to a discoursal prompt. This effect should be of great 
interest to the creative writer.  
 What is the nature of the text-world produced by the linguistically-deviant sentence 
(3)? While both sentence (1) and sentence (3) cue the construction of text-worlds containing 
world-building and function-advancing elements, the text-world built by sentence (1) will be 
qualitatively different due to the schemas invoked, which will be drawn from previous 
readings, experiences and imaginings of that (relatively) commonplace scene. The text-world 
built by (3), with its deviant syntax, will be built with reference to sentence (1), which haunts 
the background of the ÔliteralÕ translation. Thus: in (3), our ÔwritingÕ of the sentence as we 
read it, as we build a world from it, is demonstrable, dynamic and obvious; in (1), it is less 
obvious, but the process is taking place nonetheless. We writeandread in both cases, but on a 
cline. 3 emphasizes the writing end of that cline, (2), the reading end. 
 
8.3 Deixis and empathy 
The ways in which a reader builds worlds in response to a piece of creative writing is also 
related to deictic function. As already mentioned, cognitive approaches to discourse are based 
on the idea that mind and body are inextricably connected, and that the centre of perception 
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in cognitive terms equates more or less neatly with the deictic centre, or origo. Evidence for 
this comes from the language we use to position ourselves in relation to the world around us, 
giving rise to a Ð often inescapable Ð sense of subjectivity. However, deixis is not limited to 
spatial descriptives, but can also refer to the position of objects and entities, and to 
perception, time and relation. It is deictic function that allows world-building elements in a 
text-world to take effect. 
 A further important point can be drawn from this discussion of relations between 
language and perception, and that is how deixis helps us to identity with the characters of a 
text, or, more specifically, to experience empathy. Stockwell (2002: 43) refers to this process 
as Ôdeictic projectionÕ. In everyday discourse, we are able to ÔthrowÕ our deictic centre (in a 
similar way to the way a ventriloquist throws his or her voice) to occupy an external position 
by saying, for example, ÔLook behind you!Õ or ÔItÕs to your right.Õ Put simply, it is this deictic 
function of language that allows readers to empathize with characters, narrators and their 
situations.  
 It is obviously desirable to shy away from making too many hard-and-fast 
pronouncements about what constitutes ÔgoodÕ writing, but I would argue with some 
confidence that the creation (or simulation) of empathetic engagement is as close as we can 
get to one (see Keen 2010 for a principled account of the significance of empathy in the study 
of the novel). Readers are more likely to empathize with autonomous objects (such as fellow 
human beings) than with heteronomous notions or concepts. Through its proposal that readers 
conceptually project to the contextual locus of the speaker of deictic cues in order to 
comprehend them, Deictic Shift Theory (e.g. Gilbraith 1995) offers a model of how the 
deictic references determining contextual coordinates are processed by readers, how they 
render the deictic centre of the text autonomous (making ÔconcreteÕ the simulated actions, 
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perceptions, experiences etc. of the narrator of character), and how this contributes to readersÕ 
conceptualization of the world of the story.  
 Deictic Shift Theory accounts for the psychological and physical processes whereby 
our own deictic centre (both spatial and ontological) can be transposed to form an 
imaginative structure that we construct both conceptually and orientationally. Our deictic 
centre, or origo, is then used within this imaginative structure to orient ourselves. Merleau-
Ponty (1962: 112) called this process Ôa summoning of the bodyÕs freedom from immediacy.Õ 
In creative practice, the writer should be mindful of levels of engagement, or freedom from 
intimacy, and where on the scale of empathetic engagement the reader will situate him- or 
herself in relation to the text through deictic shifting. Of course, it should be mentioned too 
that some creative writing will deliberately alienate the reader, or attempt to defamiliarize his 
or her reading experience (see section 8.5). 
 
8.4 Compatibility: real worlds and fictional worlds 
If the previous section explored how discourse is related to or ÔattachedÕ to real world objects, 
and, accordingly, how readers build worlds in response to it, then this section concerns itself 
with the ontological nature of worlds built from words, their status as fiction, and the ways in 
which exploration of these questions can be brought to bear on practice. The previous section 
drew on Text World Theory, a model designed to account for discourse processing. Here, 
Possible Worlds Theory (Bell 2010; Dolezel 1998; Ronen 1994; Ryan 1992) in relation to 
world-building will be called into service due to its connection with truth-conditional 
semantics, which provides the creative writer with a way of thinking explicitly about the 
status as ÔtruthÕ of his or her created, imaginary world as well as the relationship between it 
and the context (actual world) in which the creative practice takes place. 
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To call a spade a spade is to state that which is true and verifiable in its own terms (in other 
words, those of the world in which it is uttered: the actual world). To call a spade a rake 
raises obvious questions about the relationship between signifier and signified in the 
sentence; in semantic terms, the truth conditions of the sentence are called into question. 
However, what happens if a sentence is written or uttered, but the match to actual world 
conditions is unsuccessful? This is the case in the sentence above, rephrased as Ôa spade is a 
rakeÕ. Of course, we can quite easily conceive of a situation in which a rake might be used as 
a spade (they are similar enough in function; more on this notion shortly) Ð and this is 
precisely the point. Human language, uniquely (as far as we know), can be used to refer to 
worlds that are other than the world that is; i.e. to abstract conceptions of worlds that are not 
based in the current ÔrealityÕ of the discourse situation. However, that reality is conceived in 
Possible Worlds Theory as the sum of the imaginable rather than as the sum of what exists 
physically. The centre of this system is known as the actual world (AW), while the 
conceivable worlds within it are non-actual possible worlds (APWs). Crucially, for the 
purposes of this section: for a world to be deemed possible, it must be linked to the AW by a 
relation of accessibility, which refers to the various ways in which the APWs are 
connected/linked to the AW. On the basis of this model, we can define a proposition as 
necessary if it is true in all worlds linked to the AW (including the AW itself); as possible if it 
is true in only some of these worlds; as impossible (e.g. contradictory) if it is false in all of 
them; and as true, without being necessary, if it is verified in the actual world of the system 
but not in some other possible world. 
This is the essence of how fiction works. Reality has a modal structure that is made up 
of a world that is actual, and then an Ð in principle Ð infinite number of possible worlds. 
Fiction, then, is a particular version of reality where a world treated as actual is circled by a 
number of other worlds which are non-actual. Fiction arises through what Ryan (1984, 1991) 
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describes as recentering; the implied readerÕs frame of reference as used for locating notions 
of possibility and truth shifts from the AW to a possible world. Crucially, however (and I 
would argue that this point is of great relevance to creative writers), these worlds must be 
familiar enough, similar enough, to the AW (the context of the discourse situation) to be 
recognizable. The point is: the further we stretch the gap between the world of the story and 
the AW, the more difficult it becomes to maintain that essential contract between reader and 
writer. 
Ryan (1991: 32-3) has established a typology of fictional worlds based on 
consideration of their possibility in relation to fictional genre. Taking as a starting point the 
already-outlined assumption that ÔpossibilityÕ means accessibility from the world which stand 
at the centre of a given system, Ryan defines the characteristics of each world type in terms 
of accessibility relations linking the actual worlds to the worlds projected by various types of 
fictional text. In the following quotation, TAW standard for ÔTextual Actual WorldÕ (the 
world upon which the readerÕs frame of reference has been re-centred). 
 
In decreasing order of stringency, the relevant types of accessibility 
relations from AW involved in the construction of TAW include the 
following: 
 
a) Identity of properties: TAW is accessible from AW if the objects 
common to TAW and AW have the same properties. 
b) Identity of inventory: TAW is accessible from AW if TAW and AW 
are furnished by the same objects. 
c) Compatibility of inventory: TAW is accessible from AW if TAW 
includes all the members of AW, as well as some native members. 
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d) Chronological compatibility: TAW is accessible from AW if it 
takes no temporal relocation for a member of AW to contemplate 
the entire history of TAW. (This condition means that TAW is no 
older than AW, i.e. that its present is not posterior in absolute time 
to AWÕs present. We can contemplate facts of the past from the 
viewpoint of the present, but since the future holds no facts, only 
projections, it takes a relocation beyond the time to regard as facts 
events located in the future.) 
e) Physical compatibility: TAW is accessible from AW if they share 
natural laws. 
f) Taxonomic compatibility: TAW is accessible from AW if both 
worlds contain the same species, and the species are characterized 
by the same properties. Within F, it may be useful to distinguish 
between a narrower ÔFÕ stipulating that TAW must contain not only 
the same inventory of natural species, but also the same type of 
manufactured objects as found in AW up to the present. 
g) Logical compatibility: TAW is accessible from AW if both worlds 
respect the principles of non-contradiction and of excluded middle. 
h) Analytical compatibility: TAW is accessible from AW if they share 
analytical truths, i.e. if objects designated by the same words share 
the same essential properties. 
i) Linguistic compatibility: TAW is accessible from AW if the 




Moving from the top of the list downwards, it can be seen that the first categories describe 
non-fictional work (TAW is identical with AW). As we move further down the scale, the 
distance between AW and TAW increases. For example, science fictional novels begin to 
violate (c), and also (d)-(f) (they often feature different artefacts, different time frames and 
even different natural laws; their space ships can travel faster than light, say). Once we reach 
(g) and (h), worlds become logically impossible. Contradictory states of affairs would be 
admissible, as is the case in Robbe-GrilletÕs nouveau roman La Jalousie (1969), where the 
principal character is described simultaneously and without any intended irony as both 
dishonest and honest. He is a high-ranking employee of an old commercial company and also 
a customs official. The company is performing very well. The company is heading towards 
bankruptcy and fraud. And so it continues. It is difficult to make firm assertions about such a 
textÕs status as fiction, let alone ÔtruthÕ. Once we reach (i) on the scale, we are in the realm of 
nonsense verse and experimental sound poetry; the lack of any correspondence to the AW 
leads to a lack of any coherent and sustained process of world-building in the imagination of 
the reader. Sentence 2 from the Borges short story as discussed in 8.3 is a good example of 
discourse from a world occupying point (i) on the scale.  
The lessons for the creative writer are twofold. First: the writer should be wary of the 
moment of arrest at which the world of the story (and, much less explicitly, the poem) 
becomes too incompatible, too at odds with, the implied readerÕs understanding of how the 
actual world operates. As RyanÕs scale shows, this is not to inhibit the creation of science 
fiction or fantasy worlds (these particular possible worlds have an internal coherency of their 
own). Rather, creative writers should look to avoid story attributes such as character actions, 
dialogue, imagery, narrative registers which, as far as the reader is concerned, do not accord 
with or follow from the premises of the fictional world created. For example: a character does 
something which does not chime with our understanding of her or him from the rest of the 
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story (character actions can surprise, of course, but should not stretch credulity); a narrator 
uses language that does not match the readerÕs understanding of his or her sensibility; a 
metaphor is created using a source domain that comes from something outside (or not integral 
to) the TAW of the poem, or a narrator leaves epistemological gaps in her or his mediation of 
the story world that the reader is unable to fill due to incomplete or incompatible schema. 
When this moment of arrest happens, the crucial processes of world-building are interrupted 
and the vital contract between creative writer and reader (the will to suspension of disbelief) 
is broken. RyanÕs typology provides creative writers with a useful and principled scale with 
which to test the relationship between narrative or poetic discourse and the world of the story 
and allows us to describe rigorously the degrees of compatibility between the two. It should 
be useful both editorially (i.e. in terms of rereading and rewriting work after the first draft) 
when looking for inconsistencies, and also, I would argue, in the midst of creative practice, 
where deliberately invoking incompatibility might give a piece of work new energy and a 
new direction (BorgesÕs ÔTln, Uqbar, Orbis TertiusÕ takes this concept to a highly 
entertaining and thought-provoking extreme). 
To attempt a summary of the notion of accessibility and its pertinence for creative 
practice, I would like to make use of another aspect of RyanÕs work: the Principle of Minimal 
Departure (Ryan 1980). This principle proposes that when readers construct fictional worlds, 
they work from an underlying assumption that the two worlds (AW and TAW) share the 
same properties and attributes unless they are told explicitly otherwise. In other words, this 
assumption can only be overruled by the text itself; as Semino writes, Ôwe still assume that 
everything else matches the world of our experienceÕ (1997: 64). If a poem describes a brown 
polar bear, then the TAW built in response will contain an animal that resembles the readerÕs 
conception of a polar bear (a Ôpolar bear schemaÕ will be invoked) in every aspect apart from 
its colour. The statement Ôpolar bears have four legs and live in the Arctic will of course 
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remain true in the TAW but the statement Ôpolar bears have wings and breathe fireÕ will be 
false in both worlds, unless it is specified as true by the text. This is the Principle of Minimal 
Departure in essence: readers will default to their understanding of the actual world and will 
only depart from this understanding if made to do so by the writer.  
Second, and to reiterate: language creates possible worlds when the truth conditions 
surrounding an utterance are not matched in the actual world. This relatively simple concept 
shows us how fiction ÔworksÕ and, as argued, might serve as a reasonable definition of 
creative writing. It is up to the creative writer to act as a guide through these worlds, however 
small, however complex, keeping the readerÕs engagement and interaction with the text in 
mind at all times. Herein lies the fundamental relevance of theories of world-building to the 
creative writer: it is in the appeal to a reader that a piece of writing stands or falls.  
 
8.5 Avoiding inhibition of return 
As already argued, creative writing requires a reader (and that reader may well be the writer), 
and it is in the successful activation of readersÕ schemas that creative writing comes to life 
(just as, from the perspective of the writer, it is the activity of writingandreading that 
characterizes the process of creativity). To invoke the famous (infamous?) creative writing 
dichotomy between showing and telling, or mimesis and diegesis (see Scott 2014: 16-20), it 
is the former process that exploits and makes use of the readerÕs capacity to imagine most 
effectively. If mimesis can be defined as an artistic representation of reality (Auerbach 1946), 
then language that is less overtly descriptive and proscriptive fulfils this function best by 
engaging the readerÕs imagination more actively. A simple example will demonstrate this 
effect. Take the following sentence:  
 




A world will be built in the imagination in response to this sentence. In this world, what age 
is the man? How is he dressed? What kind of material is the armchair made of? What colour 
is it? What time of day is it? What kind of book is he reading? Is it dark or light in the room? 
The answers to these questions are, for me at least, along the following lines: elderly, in a 
suit, leather, red, evening, old and hardback, dark. The building of the world is also to some 
extent cumulative, in that once I ÔhaveÕ the man as old, many of the rest of the (unwritten) 
world-building elements fall into place. Of course, none of this information is supplied 
Ôbottom upÕ from textual cues, but comes from schemas. The point is that the sentence could 
have been written as follows: 
 
The old man sat in the red leather armchair by the fire one evening wearing 
a suit and reading an old hardback book in the dark.  
 
However (arguably) this sentence commits the sin of being Ôover-writtenÕ, and is overtly 
diegetic and descriptive. Too much information is given, and the readerÕs own capacity for 
imaginative engagement is mistrusted. Put simply: this is why the creative writer should aim 
to rely on mimesis over diegesis Ð sufficient ÔspaceÕ is left for the readerÕs imagination to 
respond to the text. The mimetic function of literary discourse leaves enervating space for the 
readerÕs imagination to respond to those foregrounded features of the text by invoking 
schema to build worlds (bearing in mind the strictures discussed in section 8.4). If the 
language of the text is mostly diegetic in orientation, that process is to some extent already 
complete. The writer has done all of the imagining on the readerÕs behalf. There is less 
(although never no) need for readerly schema to be activated, disrupted, reinforced or 
preserved, and thus less space for vibrant and invigorating engagement with the text. The text 
is positioning itself too far towards the reading end of the writingandreading cline. To put this 
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another way: given that in Carter and NashÕs (1990) assertion that we ÔseeÕ though language 
into the story world beyond, it is important for the writer to decide whether or not she or he 
wishes that language to be foregrounded (the reader Ôlooks atÕ the discourse) or whether it is 
the story world beyond that should be the focus (the reader Ôsees throughÕ the discourse). Of 
course, many narratives will move backwards and forwards along the writingandreading 
cline. James JoyceÕs Ulysses (1922) is a good example of a novel that, arguably, moves at 
some point through every possible position along that cline. In addition, it is perfectly 
possible to conceive of a situation where the writer might wish to emphasize diegetic effect 
(as in the second example above) for artistic purposes.  
In addition, emphasizing the mimetic orientations of narrative discourse during 
creative practice can help to avoid inhibition of return, a concept drawn from cognitive 
science: 
 
A literary text uses stylistic patterns to focus attention on a particular 
feature, within the textual space. The precise nature of those patterns will 
vary according to circumstances, but attention will only be maintained by 
constant renewal of the stylistic interest, by a constant process of renewing 
the figure and ground relationship. This is because attention is typically 
caught by movement (in the visual field); in fact, elements in view that 
remain static are swiftly lost to attention: literature is literally a distraction 
that pulls attention away from one element onto the newly presented 
element (Stockwell 2002: 18). 
 
The ÔmovementÕ we look for in a piece of creative writing is a movement of the readerly 
imagination, a dynamism that is the result of schema being activated, reinforced, disrupted 
and changed. It should be noted too that schema disruption, in the terms of Possible Worlds 
Theory, comes about as a result of some degree of incompatibility between the AW and the 
TAW. If mimetic orientations are at the forefront, then a common problem of beginning 
creative writers will be avoided: overwriting, or overwrought descriptive language. Resisting 
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the temptation to tell too much, to set the stage too meticulously, is essential if the readerÕs 
imagination is to remain engaged and wanting more.  
 
8.6 Summary: suggestions and speculations 
It is hoped that this chapter might point the way towards a principled and rigorous reflection 
on creative practice based on linguistic conceptions of world-building. Given the myriad 
ways in which cognitive poetics has shed stark and revealing light on the mysterious 
imaginative processes involved in reading, it would be an insular writer indeed who refused 
to engage with critical theory that has so much to say about the target of her or his work. The 
summary and suggestions that follow are intended to prompt further research, exploration and 
debate in this direction. It is suggested that creative writers would benefit from: 
 
A. Generally, and as an overarching ambition: setting the notion of writingandreading at 
the centre of the creative process (indeed, as a definition of creative writing), with a 
focus on the ways in which the autonomous features of language can transform into 
the heteronomous story worlds that inhabit readersÕ imaginations and the fact that the 
acts of writing and reading can be viewed as interchangeable. Awareness of what 
happens when readers read should be a prominent factor in creative practice.  
B. Being mindful of the insights of Schema Theory, and the ways in which creative 
writing can reinforce, disrupt or modify schemas. 
C. Considering the extent to which Deictic Shift Theory and deictic projection 
(Stockwell 2002: 43) account for and enhance the extent to which a reader empathizes 
with characters and their situations. The appropriateness of the term ÔempathyÕ in this 
context is also in need of more detailed consideration. 
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D. Using Text World Theory to interrogate and itemize the internal coherency of 
individual text-worlds; e.g. ensuring a consistency and acceptability of point of view, 
checking how much a character knows or does not know about another character or 
situation, or tracking the progression and consistency of narratives with complex 
structures. Text World Theory might also be put to service in revealing how multiple 
text-worlds interact with one another and how this interaction can be used, for 
example, to enhance themes or emphasize dramatic irony. It should also help creative 
writers understand the complex but fundamental relationship between discourse, 
imagination and the worlds that are built in the interaction between the two. 
E. Using Possible Worlds Theory to monitor narrative momentum (minimal departure), 
accessibility and to avoid inhibition of return. Possible Worlds Theory also accounts 
for the relationship between fictional worlds (TAW) and the actual world (AW) in 
strict linguistic terms, allowing rigorous reflection on the relationships between 
fiction and truth. It is not sufficient to dismiss narrative fiction as simply stories that 
are not ÔtrueÕ. Possible Worlds Theory poses challenging questions about, and offers 
constructive ways of exploring, the complex relations between the worlds of fiction 
and the ÔrealÕ world. 
F. Using Schema Theory to monitor the merits and contextual appropriateness of 
diegetically- versus mimetically-oriented narrative discourse, bearing in mind that the 
disruption and modification of schemas is one of the key processes that lends 
dynamism and momentum to narrative fiction. This is also relatable to Possible 
Worlds Theory in that schema modification comes about through a mismatch between 




This chapter has been an extended appeal to creative writers, particularly those who work in 
an academic context, to consider engaging with these principled critical approaches to 
linguistic world-building and the relationship between writing and reading. Even if the 
relevance of this framework is rejected, then it is hoped that some energy can be found in the 
disagreement. To summarize the notion as far as possible, I would like to turn to Bertrand 
Russell:  
 
We have a number of experiences which we call Ôseeing the sunÕ; there is 
also, according to astronomy, a large lump of hot matter which is the sun. 
What is the relation of this lump to one of the occurrences called Ôseeing 
the sunÕ? (2011: 117) 
 
 
The Ôlump of hot matterÕ is the artefact; Ôseeing the sunÕ is its writingandreading. Both, I 
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